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In the face of steeply rising automobile insurance premiums, many
people in North America are taking another look at no-fault insur-
ance. In the past, evidence that no-fault outperforms tort in terms of
the number of automobile accident victims compensated and the
speed and economy at which this is achieved, has had a modest polit-
ical impact at best. But the promise of low premiums may, in the
current environment, be succeeding where other arguments have
failed.'
But no-fault is not a uniform concept. A no-fault plan can take
various forms.2 Indeed, new ideas are continually emerging.3 Never-
theless, schemes which have the best chance of acceptance by North
t My thanks to Professors Jeffrey O'Connell and Bruce Feldthusen, and Robert
Joost for helpful critical comments.
* Professor of Law, University of Western Ontario.
1. Although this paper mainly concerns containing premiums, it should not be
forgotten that the case for no-fault is rooted most strongly in its humanitarian advan-
tages discussed in a multitude of articles and books. See, e.g., T. ISON, THE FORENSIC
LOTTERY (1967); J. O'CONNELL, THE INJURY INDUSTRY (1971). While compensation in
individual cases is usually lower in no-fault than in successful tort claims, no-fault recov-
ery is more likely. Still, no-fault plans can vary in terms of benefit levels depending on
premium levels. Higher premiums are the cost of higher benefits, lower benefits are the
cost of lower premiums.
2. See J. O'CONNELL & R. HENDERSON, TORT LAW, No-FAULT AND BEYOND
178-84 (1975).
3. See, e.g., Cooter & Sugarman, A Regulated Market in Unmatured Tort
Claims: Tort Reform by Contract in NEW DIRECTIONS IN LIABILITY LAW 174 (W. Ol-
son ed. 1988).
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American legislatures 4 have one thing in common. They retain some
tort law which seems to represent a powerful symbo of individual
responsibility, even retribution. This is true despite the widespread
existence of liability insurance which has severely reduced the extent
to which these values are actually implemented.
To date, two basic models have been developed for integrating tort
and no-fault. One combines both so that at least some accident vic-
tims have access to tort and no-fault remedies. The other gives a
buyer of insurance, at the time of purchase, a choice of tort or no-
fault as the means of determining her compensation entitlement
should she become an accident victim.
In this article I propose a third model: a scheme which allows an
accident victim to choose between tort and no-fault after the acci-
dent has occurred. I present this not as a superior model, but as an
additional item to the menu from which reform minded legislatures
may select. Each of these three basic models can reduce and stabi-
lize costs. However, each has features which may appeal more or less
to different policy makers. These features relate to the residual role
of tort law. One of the truths about automobile accident compensa-
tion policy is that it is nothing if not a matter of values.' Different
values may be given different emphasis in different jurisdictions.
This does not mean that all jurisdictions cannot have no-fault laws
that achieve the basic goals of wider adequate compensation and
lower premiums than delivered under a system based primarily on
tort.
OPTION I: COMBINATION TORT-NO-FAULT
Until recently, no-fault plans have coexisted with tort in one of
two ways: (1) the "add-on" method; or (2) by the "modification" of
tort law. Add-on no-fault provides first party benefits without affect-
ing tort rights, except for the fact that no-fault benefits cannot be
duplicated by tort recovery and tort damages are reduced accord-
ingly.7 Modified schemes confine lawsuits to cases involving the more
4. The only exception is in Quebec where a "pure' no-fault scheme has been
implemented. See C. BROWN, NO-FAULT AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE IN CANADA 32
(1988).
5. See C. OSBORNE, REPORT OF INQUIRY INTO MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT COM-
PENSATION IN ONTARIO 548-49 (1988). My appreciation of the functional value of sym-
bolism in legal institutions including tort law is attributable to the seminal work on the
subject by Thurman Arnold, The Symbols of Government. T. ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF
GOVERNMENT (1935).
6. In his report, Judge Osborne stated: "[I]n the final analysis value judgments
have to be made. They have been, and they are mine." C. OSBORNE, supra note 5, at 506.
7. Add-on plans are in place in Delaware, Maryland, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Ar-
kansas, Texas, South Carolina, and Washington in the United States. See U.S. DEP'T OF
TRANSPORTATION, COMPENSATING AUTO ACCIDENT VICTIMS: A FOLLOW-UP REPORT
ON NO-FAULT AUTO INSURANCE EXPERIENCES 41 (1985). All Canadian jurisdictions,
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seriously injured who are identified by the amount of medical ex-
penses paid or by reference to a verbal formula such as "serious im-
pairment or permanent disfigurement." 8
Studies suggest that an improperly designed combination tort-no-
fault plan may be more expensive than pure tort.9 Obviously, to
achieve savings under any type of plan, there must be a reduction in
current tort costs. The usual targets for achieving this reduction are
litigation expenses and payments for pain and suffering, especially in
minor cases. Add-on plans save nothing in pain and suffering pay-
ments and very little in transaction costs because all victims are enti-
tled to pursue at least some tort damages. Even if the no-fault bene-
fits are generous, and the offset against damages therefore
significant, pain and suffering damages are still available. Some
modified plans fail to foreclose enough claims for pain and suffering
to achieve sufficient savings. Those that do achieve savings overall
are said to be "in balance" in that there is a sufficient reduction in
tort related expenses to cover the cost of the no-fault benefits pro-
vided. Another factor in these combination plans is that no-fault
benefits provide a measure of financial security so that recipients can
afford to pursue litigation for pain and suffering which they might
otherwise have been forced to abandon or compromise. This tends to
increase costs. 10
A tightly worded and administered threshold can overcome this
problem." Moreover, there are valid reasons for distinguishing be-
tween, say, permanent and nonpermanent injuries in defining eligi-
other than Quebec, also have add-on schemes. See C. BROWN, supra note 4, at ch. 1. The
Ontario government has announced its intention to introduce a threshold scheme in the
near future.
8. Modified schemes exist in Colorado, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Flor-
ida, Georgia, Hawaii, Kansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New
Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Puerto Rico, and Utah. See U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPOR-
TATION, supra note 7, at 23.
9. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, supra note 7, at 86-87.
10. See O'Connell & Guinivan, An Irrational Combination The Relative Expan-
sion of Liability Insurance and the Contraction of Loss Insurance, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 757
(1988); see also O'Connell & Joost, Giving Motorists a Choice Between Fault and No-
Fault Insurance, 72 VA. L. REv. 61, 71 (1986). This point is directed solely to the ques-
tion of cost. If there is a valid case for allowing relatively minor noneconomic claims, and
if this case overrides the case for wider recovery for economic loss, then removing unfair
financial pressure to settle might be a good thing.
11. The Michigan, Florida, and New York thresholds have been the most success-
ful in achieving balance, but even these have been subject to wider than expected inter-
pretation. See, e.g. C. OSBORNE, supra note 5, at 472-81 (concerning Michigan). A re-
lated problem is whether the test is one for the jury or the judge, the concern being that
a jury is more likely to allow a tort suit.
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bility for pain and suffering damages.12 Yet, some consider any
threshold to be an arbitrary denial of some victims' access to tort
law.'" To them the value of the opportunity to sue outweighs the
value of wider eligibility for compensation.
OPTION II: A CHOICE BETWEEN TORT AND NO-FAULT
Recently, the no-fault debate has entered a new dimension. Pro-
fessor O'Connell and Robert Joost have devised an ingenious means
of providing no-fault insurance while preserving the symbols of tort
law in a way which would achieve overall cost savings.14 They pro-
pose giving insureds, at the time they purchase coverage, a choice
between a no-fault policy and a tort policy. Those choosing no-fault
would opt out of tort entirely15 and would pay significantly less for
their coverage as a result. 6 In the event of an accident, a person
having made that choice would receive no-fault benefits, but would
not be able to sue a wrongdoer even for pain and suffering damages.
Neither could she be sued, if she happened to injure another person.
Someone opting for tort would have her entitlement to damages de-
termined according to the rules of tort. That is, if she was at fault,
she would have no entitlement to compensation; if she had been in-
jured by someone else's negligence, there would be an entitlement to
damages measured according to tort rules.' 7 Where an accident in-
volved one person who was a tort chooser, and another who was a
no-fault chooser and the no-fault chooser was at fault, the tort
chooser would have to turn to her own insurer for her tort compensa-
tion. This would operate in much the same way as uninsured motor-
ist coverage operates today.'
12. Provided the no-fault scheme delivers relatively generous benefits for medical
and rehabilitation expenses, including coverage for such items as house and car renova-
tions, occupational retraining, and recreational therapy, the need for pain and suffering
damages decreases, especially for claimants whose recovery is sufficient to allow them to
resume a normal lifestyle.
13. See, e.g., C. OSBORNE, supra note 5, at 567.
14. See supra note 10.
15. Note that even those opting out of tort "entirely" may be subject to claims
which might be brought against them arising from accidents out of the jurisdiction or
(perhaps) by pedestrians who have no auto insurance themselves.
16. Depending on the level of benefits provided in the no-fault package, the price
differential is likely to be significant. An actuary's report on a recent proposal by the
Ontario Insurance Industry for a choice model predicted savings of about 25%. Insur-
ance Bureau of Canada Choice Proposal (Dec. 13, 1988) [hereinafter Choice Proposal]
(on file with the author). The plan called for generous benefits. See infra notes 43-49 and
accompanying text.
17. Since this preference entails litigation expenses and an entitlement to pain and
suffering damages, the premium will be higher. See supra note 16.
18. The Ontario proposal was that all claims under tort policies be referred to
claimants' own insurers. Thus the whole scheme would be first party but tort-choosers
would be entitled to tort-style damages, if they could prove fault on the part of a third
party. See Choice Proposal, supra note 16.
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The beauty of this scheme is that it responds both to the urge for
security represented by no-fault and to the urge for symbolic ac-
countability represented by tort law. It also incorporates another
powerful symbol, freedom of choice. However, it also demonstrates
clearly the economies of no-fault. Those who are not prepared to
forgo the psychological or other attractions of tort do not have to do
so, but they must pay the additional costs attendant upon that sys-
tem-chiefly the costs associated with quantum of damages and
proving fault.
This brilliant concept can work.19 Nonetheless, some may hesitate
to embrace it. Perhaps the principal concern is that many consumers
will not be fully informed when they make their choices. The details
and implications of tort law and no-fault schemes are complex, and
it may be that some consumers may not fully understand the options
they have. A related question concerns brokers' liability. A claimant,
who in retrospect feels disadvantaged by her choice, may seek to
blame her broker for failing to explain the choice fully. While bro-
kers can be given reasonable protection if they use approved forms
and descriptive material, this does not necessarily improve the ability
of consumers to understand the scheme. It may be thought that the
choice appropriately should not be made until injury has actually
occurred. Another concern might relate to the fact that, in some cir-
cumstances, insureds will have the choice made for them by others.
Depending on the structure of the scheme, this could happen to pas-
sengers of vehicles owned by other people, or to members of a family
in which the head of the household owns and insures the single fam-
ily vehicle.20 There may also be philosophical objections to a scheme
which allows different motorists to operate under different liability
rules in the same jurisdiction,2 or one that in effect enables some
people to buy immunity from suit. But this same objection should
logically apply to all liability insurance, and seems not to have been
raised in that context recently. 2
19. Recently a consumer group in the United States has initiated "Project New
Start" which promotes the concept of "The Personal Protection Policy," a variant of the
O'Connell-Joost choice proposal. Consumer Insurance Project, News Release (Feb. 24,
1989).
20. Of course, under any scheme, including tort, some people have choices effec-
tively made for them by others. In the case of an injured child, for example, decisions
about settlement are made by parents. Even adult claimants often have options fore-
closed by the defendants' choices about the level of liability insurance they carry.
21. Carr, Giving Motorists a Choice Between Fault and No-Fault Insurance: An
Economic Critique, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1087 (1989).
22. For a description of early objections to liability insurance along these lines, see
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A THIRD OPTION: POSTACCIDENT CHOICE
If any of these concerns seriously troubles a legislature, there is
another way in which the benefits of no-fault and the attractions of
tort may be joined while preserving freedom of choice. The choice
could be permitted after an accident. Every insured would have the
same kind of policy providing (a) no-fault benefits conditional upon
the insured's agreeing not to sue a third party in tort and (b) liabil-
ity insurance covering the possibility that the insured will be sued by
another person who had elected not to pursue a no-fault remedy.
Thus, after an accident, a victim (any person seeking compensation)
could choose the tort remedy or no-fault, but not a combination of
both.2 3 Concerns about immunity, choosing for others, and, most im-
portantly, the problem of informed choice at the time of insurance
purchase would be met.2 4 Moreover, since every motorist would con-
tinue to be subject to possible tort sanctions (since no one would
know when she was going to be sued), whatever deterrent effect tort
achieves would be preserved. 5 The security and certainty provided
by no-fault payments would be available to all. The right to sue
would be available to all. But, unlike threshold plans, the security
provided by no-fault could not be used to finance the pursuit of tort
claims.
Gardner, Insurance Against Tort Liability, 15 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 455, 462
(1950). There are related pricing concerns. How, for example, should the scheme deal
with motorcycles and heavy commercial vehicles? The former group are a high risk cate-
gory for no-fault and low for tort. For the latter group, the reverse applies. If all trucks
were covered by no-fault-and immune from suit-this, it is argued, would drive up the
cost of tort-choosers' policies. In other words, tort premiums could subsidize no-fault
policyholders. If this is indeed a problem (and at present it is merely theoretical)-it can
be addressed in one of two ways. The high risk categories mentioned are either excluded
from the no-fault option (as motorcycles are in Michigan) or subrogation is allowed
where, for example, a motorcyclist is injured or a claimant's injuries are caused by a
truck. Cf. C. OSBORNE, supra note 5, at 590.
23. Professor O'Connell has designed a proposal broadly along these lines for high
school athletic injuries. See O'Connell, A "Neo No-Fault" Contract in Lieu of Tort:
Preaccident Guarantees of Postaccident Settlement Offers, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 898, 914
(1985). Postaccident choice also exists in the Swedish medical accident compensation
scheme. See Brahms, The Swedish "No-Fault" Compensation System for Medical Inju-
ries, 138 NEw LJ. 14, 31 (1988); Cohen & Korper, Medical Malpractice in Sweden, 21
TRIAL 52 (1985); Hellner, Compensation for Personal Injury: The Swedish Alternative,
34 Mi. J. ComP. L. 613 (1986); Oldertz, The Swedish No-Fault Patient Program: Provi-
sions and Preliminary Findings, 637 INS. L.J. 70 (1976). Concerns about immunity,
choosing for others, and, most importantly, the problem of informed choice at the time of
insurance purchase would be met.
24. See infra note 42.
25. Curtailment of tort rights for personal injury claims arising from auto acci-
dents seems to have little adverse effect on accident rates. See U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPOR-
TATION, supra note 7, at 141-43.. One of the most significant deterrent factors in any type
of insurance scheme is its pricing mechanism. See Trebilcock, Incentive Issues in The
Design of "No-Fault" Compensation Systems, 39 U. TORONTO L.J. 19 (1989). However,
a no-fault scheme can have classified (including experience) ratings. See Brown, Deter-
rence and Accident Compensation Schemes, 17 U.W. ONT. L. REv. 111 (1979).
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But would this work? Would it be cheaper than a tort-dominated
regime? A reader's initial reaciion might be that adverse selection
would result in increased costs. I believe that, if the plan is properly
structured to include significant incentives even for victims with good
tort claims to choose the no-fault remedy, this will not occur. After
his inquiry relating to no-fault in Ontario, Judge Osborne thought a
system providing both generous no-fault benefits for all and a further
right for all to sue in tort for additional damages could be imple-
mented without adding to costs, if certain tort reforms were imple-
mented.26 That suggests that this plan, which would let a victim
have one but not both of these features, would be cost effective, espe-
cially if some refinements could be made to tort. Even if the Osborne
view cannot be sustained,27 there are other reasons for predicting
that this plan would save money compared to a system based chiefly
on tort if relatively minor tort cases could be eliminated. Assume the
no-fault package was sufficiently generous to provide for most of the
economic losses suffered by most accident victims. People with sig-
nificant economic losses could be expected to prefer the certainty
and speed of the no-fault remedy over the expense and delays of tort,
even though potential tort damages, especially with noneconomic loss
included, could be greater.28 This result would be even more likely
should tort be reformed so that damages would be reduced. A reduc-
tion in tort damages could be achieved, for example, by avoiding
duplication of collateral sources, making structured settlements
mandatory, and limiting awards for pain and suffering.2 9 The class
26. C. OSBORNE, supra note 5, at 568.
27. One reason to doubt the viability of the proposal is his assertion that "the no-
fault benefit plan I have proposed should work to limit the number of cases entering [the
tort system] . . . in that the increased benefits will make it less likely an injured person
will feel required to sue to secure compensation." Id. at 587. This ignores the phenome-
non, observed in the United States, of no-fault benefits serving to finance tort claims for
additional damages-especially for pain and suffering. See supra note 10 and accompa-
nying text.
28. This hypothesis seems to be borne out by the experience under an O'Connell-
inspired, postaccident choice proposal dealing with high school athletic injuries. See gen-
erally O'Connell, supra note 23. O'Connell has written, referring both to the athletic
injury plan and the experience of jurisdictions that allow injured workers to choose either
tort damages or workers' compensation, that "claimants who have suffered serious injury
are likely to become risk averse even if they have an arguably valid tort claim given a
choice between certain, if limited, benefits and the gamble of a lawsuit." Id. at 911.
29. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT OF THE TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP
ON THE CAUSES, EXTENT AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE CURRENT CRISIS IN INSUR-
ANCE AVAILABILITY AND AFFORDABILITY (1986). Similar measures have been recom-
mended in Ontario. See C. OSBORNE, supra note 5, ch. 10. It might also be possible to
restrict tort claims to those who can prove fault according to a tighter standard of care
1101
of claimants most likely to opt for tort would be those who suffer no
significant economic loss or suffer losses which are compensated
from other sources, and whose tort claims consist mainly of
noneconomic loss. If some method could be found to eliminate the
bulk of these cases for noneconomic loss, there should be sufficient
savings to fund the no-fault cover and still reduce overall costs.
According to the claims survey commissioned by Judge Osborne,
more than ninety percent of the claims in tort in automobile cases in
Ontario achieve awards or settlements of $20,000 (1983 dollars) or
less.30 Further, awards of $20,000 or less account for approximately
seventy percent of all money paid out under the tort system. 31 From
other figures given in the Osborne report, it can be estimated that, of
this money paid out in amounts of $20,000 or less, more than sixty
percent represents noneconomic loss.32 That means that at least forty
percent 33 of all money being paid out to tort claimants is paying for
noneconomic loss in relatively minor cases. Figures like this enabled
insurance industry actuaries in Ontario to predict that a threshold
no-fault scheme (precluding suits for noneconomic loss unless a
threshold of serious and permanent injury was met) would effect sav-
ings of twenty percent compared to a tort system with modest add-
(for example, "gross negligence") or according to a higher standard of proof or both.
This would restrict the symbolic value of tort cases to truly egregious conduct and ex-
clude mere inadvertence. See Johnston, Punitive Liability: A New Paradigm of Effi-
ciency in Tort Law, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 1385 (1987).
30. C. OSBORNE, supra note 5, at 576.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 260, 359. One table shows that of the money paid in settlements and
judgments in amounts of $10,000 or under in 1986, 70.5% represented payments for
nonpecuniary damages. A second table puts the figure at 47.2% for settlements and
judgments between $10,000 and $75,000. Given the pattern that, the lower the total the
higher the proportion for nonpecuniary damages, it can be conservatively estimated that
in the zero to $20,000 range of settlements and judgments, the figure is closer to 70%
than 47%, that is, something over 60%.
33. 60% x 70% x total payments = 42% x total payments
Another table presented by C. OSBORNE, supra note 5, at 258, shows that 45% of the
total of all settlements and judgments is attributable to nonpecuniary loss.
In Ontario, there is little need to worry about the upper end of the scale of nonpecu-
niary loss awards because a judicially imposed cap on nonpecuniary damages has been
applied since Andrews v. Grand & Toy Alberta Ltd., 2 S.C.R. 229 (1978) and two other
seminal cases were decided by the Supreme Court of Canada in 1978. In the United
States, on the other hand, the large size of the relatively few payments made for
noneconomic loss in excess of $100,000 has caused a major problem and caps have been
imposed or proposed in several jurisdictions (although some courts have held such caps to
be unconstitutional). See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, TORT POLICY WORK GROUP, UPDATE
ON THE LIABILITY CRISIS 78 (1987). Nonetheless, there is in the United States, as in
Ontario, potential for great savings in the elimination of claims at the lower end. See J.
O'CONNELL & R. HENDERSON, supra note 2, at 100. Note that other features of the
Ontario system affect a comparison with United States jurisdictions. These include the
existence of state administered universal health insurance, restrictions on contingency
fees, imposition of some legal costs on the losing party in a lawsuit, and fewer awards in
punitive damage.
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on benefits. 4 If these figures are valid for a combination scheme in
which claimants get both no-fault benefits and tort rights in serious
cases, at least similar savings should be achieved where claimants
can pursue only one of these remedies.
As with threshold schemes, some may question whether elimina-
tion of claims of this type and amount is appropriate. I believe it is.
When there is increasing public demand to reduce the cost of auto
insurance, it is appropriate to look to the various components of auto
insurance coverage and curtail those which, relative to the others,
are least important. If we can offer a scheme that provides for virtu-
ally all economic losses, retains for those who want it the right to sue
with respect to serious injury, and still achieves considerable cost re-
ductions, the elimination of claims for relatively minor noneconomic
loss is justified.
Another question is: How can these claims be eliminated in practi-
cal terms? As I see it, there are three broad options. The first is a
verbal threshold similar to that used in modified no-fault plans such
as Michigan's.3 5 Although anyone could choose to sue in tort (and
forgo no-fault benefits), her tort claim could not include any amount
for noneconomic loss unless she could demonstrate that she had, for
example, suffered serious impairment of a body function or serious
permanent disfigurement."6 A second method is a deductible which
would be applied to any part of a tort judgment representing
noneconomic loss. For example, a deductible of $20,000 would mean
that where an award is made for noneconomic loss for $50,000, the
victim would receive only $30,000. A third method is a dollar thresh-
old. A victim who chose to sue in tort would have to demonstrate
that her damages for noneconomic loss, measured in the normal way,
exceeded the threshold. If the damages in that category exceeded the
threshold, she would receive them all. If they did not, she would re-
ceive none.
However, the dollar threshold could be too easily undermined.
There might be a temptation on the part of courts to make sure
awards met the required amount, especially where they are within
$200 or $300 anyway. The deductible method avoids this although it
34. Submission by Insurance Bureau of Canada to Hon. Justice C.A. Osborne,
Inquiry into Motor Vehicle Accident Compensation in Ontario 39 (1987) [hereinafter
Submission by I.B.C.].
35. The threshold is "[d]eath, serious impairment of a body function, or perma-
nent serious disfigurement." See U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, supra note 7, at 34.
36. The threshold could be tighter than this and allow only the permanently as
well as seriously injured to sue. See Submission by I.B.C., supra note 34, at 15.
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may be considered unfair to those with genuinely serious injuries.
After all, it would operate across the board and would be subtracted
from even a $200,000 award for noneconomic loss. The United
States experience with verbal thresholds in modified no-fault
schemes has been mixed.3 7 Some have been unexpectedly widely in-
terpreted, especially where juries are involved, so that cost assump-
tions have been undermined. 38 It is possible to guard against this,
but thresholds that are too strict attract the criticism that too many
appropriate cases are excluded. 9
I propose a combination of the dollar threshold and a deductible.
It would work in this way. Any claim for tort which resulted in an
award for nonpecuniary loss of $40,000 or less, for example, would
be subject to a deductible of $20,000. Thus the deductible only
works at the lower end and does not penalize the genuinely seriously
injured. With the threshold for operation of the deductible at
$40,000, manipulations of awards to satisfy it will not seriously un-
dermine the costing of the scheme which is based on the elimination
of awards in the $20,000 range.
Safeguards would have to be built into a postaccident choice plan
to address the fact that, in making the choice, victims will often be
guided by advice, either from lawyers or insurers or both. Both have
financial incentives to encourage victims to choose tort. While both
insurers and lawyers would be bound by duties of care and utmost
good faith with respect to claimants, 40 there should also be legisla-
tion requiring certain information, such as the projected time and
costs involved in pursuing a tort action, be given to the victim in
approved form before the choice is considered binding.4'
Unlike the O'Connell-Joost plan, this scheme does not give full
credit to those people who are inclined to elect no-fault for the sav-
ings that exercise of their preference would bring. This is because
they continue to carry liability insurance. Remember that although
their general inclination might be to choose no-fault, circumstances
may arise where, after all, they wish to pursue actions in tort. This
scheme gives them that continued right in return for the additional
premium.42 This is the key difference between the two choice op-
37. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
38. See Ransom & Sinas, The Evolving No-Fault Tort Threshold, 65 MICH. Bus.
J. 528 (1986).
39. See, e.g., C. OSBORNE, supra note 5, at 567.
40. See, e.g., Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal.
Rptr. 13 (1967).
41. Official approval of auto insurance forms is common. See, e.g., Insurance Act,
ONT. REV. STAT. ch. 218, § 203 (1980).
42. Despite the premium, this is perhaps the chief appeal of the plan. No one is
forced to choose in the abstract. Everyone retains tort rights until they are in a position
to determine what those rights are (or are not) in a particular case, and what their needs
are.
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tions. Which option should be taken is a matter of policy preference
and it is for legislatures to decide which is more important: lower
premiums for no-fault choosers or an enhanced freedom of choice of
remedy. Either is possible at a price below that of a system based
mainly on tort.
THE NO-FAULT BENEFIT PACKAGE
The attraction of the no-fault option in the postaccident choice
proposal, and also, to some extent in pre-accident choice,43 will de-
pend on the levels of the no-fault benefits. This means that benefits
must be adequate. However, they must not be so generous as to frus-
trate the demand for premium level containment. In Ontario, a pro-
posal made recently for a pre-accident choice plan recognizes this. 4
By way of illustration, the following sets out a benefit package and
some relevant design considerations which have been found to satisfy
these requirements in Ontario.
Medical and Rehabilitation Benefits
Elimination of compensation for pain and suffering can be justified
in part if victims can have access, through the no-fault scheme, to
adequate coverage for medical care and rehabilitation which directly
address pain and other nonpecuniary aspects of an injury. Effective
rehabilitation also helps many victims recover more quickly and
thereby, over the long-term, saves the scheme money in that the
sooner the recovery, the sooner the return to work and the termina-
tion of income replacement benefits. In its choice proposal, the Onta-
rio Insurance Industry has specified $500,000 for this category.
However, it is necessary to provide some controls so that cost as-
sumptions are borne out. One way is to limit recovery for specific
items in terms of how often they can be claimed and in what
amounts. For example, alterations to a house or automobile might be
provided only once.4 5 Medical bills must be paid in amounts com-
mensurate with the standards of the jurisdiction involved.
43. Although premium levels in pre-accident choice will probably be the most sig-
nificant factor.
44. See Choice Proposal, supra note 16. Note that this proposal was not accepted.
The government has since introduced a threshold plan.
45. See C. BROWN, supra note 4, at ch. 1.
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Long-Term Care
Where tort is not available, it is necessary to provide a substitute
source of compensation for long-term care. The Ontario proposal en-
visages a sum of $500,000 for this category. Reasonable limits can
be placed on individual claims. For example, the periodic payment of
future care benefits could be limited to the lesser of "the monthly
cost of a group residence that will be appropriate to the needs and
lifestyle of the insured, or the monthly cost of homemaker services
not exceeding 12 hours a day."
46
Income Replacement Benefits
No-fault schemes usually pay income replacement benefits accord-
ing to a victim's actual income loss, subject to a maximum. This
maximum should be sufficiently high to provide real compensation to
most claimants. The Ontario proposal suggests a level of $600 per
week which would cover in excess of ninety percent of claimants in
that province. Here a balance must be drawn between completeness
of coverage, given that no-fault will be chosen as a substitute for
tort, and a concern that if the maximum is too high, many claimants
would be paying for coverage that they do not need because their
actual income is less than the maximum.
47
Pressure on this part of no-fault coverage can be mitigated by tak-
ing into account collateral sources. This can be done by making no-
fault benefits additional to other sources of compensation, or by pro-
viding for pro rata contribution by all sources including no-fault
benefits.48
It is also necessary to provide for persons not employed at the time
of the accident but who, because of the accident, are denied the op-
portunity to earn income in the future. This includes unemployed
persons and persons yet to enter the work force. In dealing with
these claims, it is necessary to be somewhat arbitrary, but then
again, that is true for tort. The Ontario proposal recommends that
certain categories of unemployed be compensated according to the
income last received, and that students be paid an arbitrary amount
46. Id. I appreciate that whether provision of care to this standard is "reasonable"
is controversial. But any assessment should be viewed in the context of the trade-off
usually inherent in no-fault proposals and always involved in cost containment. See supra
note 1.
47. However, those who earn more than the benefit level can purchase additional
layers of coverage either in the general disability insurance market or, perhaps, under an
endorsement to the auto policy. Similar arguments can be made for limiting coverage for
medical and future benefits. See supra notes 1 & 46. There too insureds could volunta-
rily buy additional coverage for a higher standard of care.
48. For a combination of these methods, see Ontario Insurance Act, ONT. Rv.
STAT. ch. 218, sch. c (1980).
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related to the average income in the jurisdiction.
49
It is appropriate that all of these benefits be indexed for inflation
since tort law and its mechanisms for calculating inflation in assess-
ing damages are not available.
Death Benefits
An amount ($3,000 per claim in the Ontario scheme) should be
available for funeral expenses. There should also be other death ben-
efits where there are dependants. Although death benefits may be
regarded as an inappropriate imposition of life insurance coverage, it
should be remembered that the no-fault scheme replaces tort law
which does provide for compensation to dependents in the event of
death, and it is appropriate for no-fault to provide reasonably com-
parable death benefits. The Ontario proposal includes a lump sum
payment equal to four times the gross employment income of the
deceased as revealed in the last income tax return filed before death.
This amount is subject to a minimum of $50,000 and a maximum of
$200,000. Small payments are also provided for in the event of
deaths of dependent children or of persons with no dependants.
Housekeeping and Child Care Services
The Ontario proposal provides a maximum amount of $200 a
week, payable on the basis of reasonable expenses incurred for up to
three years for housekeeping services necessitated by the injury or
death of the person who normally contributed those services. A fur-
ther $200 a week plus $50 a week per additional dependent child to
a maximum of $350 a week is payable for child care expenses.
CONCLUSION
The costs of combination and pre-accident choice no-fault schemes
with benefit packages like those described above have been esti-
mated. It is predicted they would produce net savings to premium
payers. Savings are achieved by eliminating substantial amounts of
tort activity. This is achieved either by legally abolishing some tort
actions or by providing an option wherein significant incentives are
provided for claimants to reject tort and prefer a no-fault option
without tort's attendant litigation expenses and without claims for
49. See C. OSBORNE, supra note 5, at 574-80 (from which this aspect of the insur-
ance industry's proposal is derived).
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pain and suffering. In my view, savings could also be achieved with
the model involving postaccident choice I have described, since it too
is designed to reduce tort claims.50 But which of these methods of
achieving savings and stability should be used will depend on other
policy preferences of the jurisdiction in question. These preferences
will relate to the role of tort, and the importance of choice at either
the pre-accident or postaccident stage. But, whichever option is cho-
sen, opportunities exist for considerable improvement both in terms
of the treatment of victims of accidents and the cost of the scheme to
all motorists. 5
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50. Note the postaccident choice model is adaptable to other classes of accidents
such as medical accidents and those caused by products. See supra note 25.
51. C. OSBORNE, supra note 5, at 580.
